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In our target article we showed that the Letter of Concern (LoC) fails to
meet accepted standards for presenting empirical data for the purpose of
supplementing a normative claim and for argument-based normative
ethics. The LoC fails to meet the standards of evidence-based reasoning
by making false claims, failing to reference data that undermine its key
premises, and misrepresenting and misinterpreting the scientific
publications it selectively references. The LoC fails to meet the standards
of argument-based reasoning by treating as settled matters what are,
instead, ongoing controversies, offering “mere opinion” as a substitute for
argument, and making contradictory claims. The LoC is methodologically
defective and thus a case study in unethical transgressive bioethics. Not

withdrawing the LoC will damage the field of bioethics, making this case
study in unethical transgressive bioethics important for the entire
field.
MEETING THE STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE-BASED AND ARGUMENT-BASED
REASONING IN BIOETHICS
We deliberately refrained from addressing normative concerns regarding
whether dexamethasone ought to be recommended for use in gravid
women at risk for transmitting CAH to a child. Most of the commentators
(Dolan 2010; Green 2010; Kamenova 2010; Reis and Kessler 2010;
Robichaud 2010; Tamar-Mattis 2010) take us to task for giving short shrift to
this. Whatever ancillary merits their arguments have, they miss the point: It
is neither necessary nor sufficient to hold any particular view regarding the
normative advisability of recommending dexamethasone in this clinical
context, in order to insist that thosewhoadvance any particular normative
view of the matter have an obligation, as amatter of intellectual and moral
integrity in bioethics, to meet the standards of evidence-based and
argument-based reasoning.
Kraft (2010) takes the view that “bioethical reflection requires the
interrogation of practices that appear problematic” (emphasis added).
This is an invitation to anarchy when“appearances” fail to correspond to
facts in plain view. Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann (2010) dismiss the
requirement of evidence-based reasoning as “weird logic.” If hewing
to the “right” normative ends is sufficient grounds for exempting scholars
from adherence to accepted standards of intellectual and moral integrity,
then both scientific and normative inquiry are gravely damaged. If this
egregiously defective methodology is accepted in bioethics, the field
shall be, justly, consigned to History’s dustbin as mere politics by other
means.
It is therefore scandalous to find that only Lantos (2010) addresses any of
the series of empirical missteps found in the LoC. No other commentator
thinks it ethically important enough to emphasize that all the pertinent
empirical data on the effects of dexamethasone on fetal phenotypic and
cognitive development, or on gravid women, should be accurately
presented before publicly issuing a j’accuse. They endorse the ethical
permissibility of falsely insinuating that a prominent researcher willfully and
systematically ignored these considerations. One would never know, from
the LoC, or these commentaries, that Dr. New’s research for the last two
decades has focused precisely on the study of the long-term outcomes of
this therapy for gravid women and their children and has had IRB
approval. Instead, our criticism is characterized as a gratuitous and

spectacular display (at best), as illicit “monitoring”or “silencing,” or (at
worst) as a surreptitious attempt to deflect regulatory attention. It is
staggering that many of the commentators believe that Dr. New need not
fear the repercussions of damaging and widely promulgated
accusations—the worst possible interpretation of her motives rearranged
as tendentious rhetorical questions1 —and an aggressive invitation to
regulatory scrutiny, unless she somehow has something to hide. This is
Salem’s justice. The collateral damage already done to Dr. New’s
reputation is derived from an illicitly borrowed presumption of scholarly
due diligence on the part of her critics. When this presumption is abused,
as it is in the LoC, it is more than her critics who suffer. It is the intellectual
and moral integrity of bioethics itself.
Only Lantos seems to recognize our original point, that a randomized,
prospective clinical trial (which no one, including Dr. New, fails to endorse
as a methodological ideal), in the case of a disease with a very low
incidence and prevalence, is so statistically underpowered as to be
meaningless or, worse, materially misleading. The European PREDEX study
represents the moral and methodological ideal insisted upon in the LoC.
However, it has been able to enroll so few subjects that its data have been
so riddled with Type I errors that it has not been able to reproduce
previously reported findings. This creates a dilemma for the LoC and for
Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann. On the one hand, affirming PREDEX as the
sole means of ascertaining the safety of administering dexamethasone in
this context would eliminate the likelihood of any empirically meaningful
research on the matter (given the inevitably small sample size and thus
low statistical power). This is methodologically disingenuous. On the other
hand, such an affirmation admits that pregnant women and fetuses would
be exposed to acceptable risks. But this is just what the LoC denies,
making the call for clinical trials in the LoC and by Dreger, Feder, and
Lindemann ethically disingenuous. The insistence on a randomized,
prospective controlled trial is proffered in bad faith.
THE BIOETHICS IMAGINARY
We find only a few points of disagreement with Reis and Kessler’s
summation of the historical context of the tragic record of the
crudemedicalization of intersex conditions by John Money, except to
observe that (a) Money’s approach has been discredited philosophically
(McCullough 2002) and no longer shapes current standards in pediatric
endocrinology (Lee, Houk, Ahmed, and Hughes 2006), (b) Dr. New is not
Dr. Money, and (c) Reis and Kessler’s narrative is wholly irrelevant to
whether one is obliged to get one’s facts right. Still, they and Green and
Tamar-Mattis repeat the charge, more crudely leveled by Dreger, Feder,

and Lindemann, that the normative impetus for using dexamethasone
here could only be predicated on the heterosexist and homophobic
premise that dexamethasone somehow prevents lesbianism.
Neither Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann, nor Green, nor Reis and Kessler,
nor Tamar-Mattis offers any evidence whatever for this accusation that
investigators of prenatal administration of dexamethasone are engaging
in heteronormative eugenics.2 Having exempted bioethics from the
discipline of evidence-based reasoning, Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann
expect their readers and the readers of the LoC to accept their repeated
trope of heart-felt “concern,” expressed more in sorrow than anger, as an
intellectually and morally authoritative substitute. They also expect two
government agencies and three universities, all committed to the
improvement of medicine by evidence-based reasoning and bioethical
oversight, to accept that evidence-based reasoning is “weird logic” and
thus not required in research ethics. They thereby introduce into bioethics
what we call the bioethics imaginary2: the systematic violation of
evidence-based reasoning posing as methodologically legitimate.
In the hands of Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann and their fellow
interrogators the bioethics imaginary and its menagerie of “appearances”
come to a bad end. Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann, along with Reis and
Kessler, style themselves champions of the autonomy of pregnant women.
It is therefore at least ironic that their deployment of the bioethics
imaginary completely undermines the autonomy of pregnant women. Reis
and Kessler imply that all these women seek to have, or would permit
having, supplicant-like, their pregnancies and their choices for their
children routinely abrogated by physicians, thus endorsing an
unwarranted, paternalist condescension toward the considered views and
capacity for autonomous judgment of pregnant women. It “appears” to
Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann that clinically experienced, licensed
physicians prescribing dexamethasone would blithely permit Dr. New to
“push . . . all of the risk onto obstetricians who may have had no idea what
they were part of and none of the expertise required to inform patients of
the risks and unknowns.” Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann thus treat
pregnant women as children, as heteronomous creatures helplessly
susceptible to manipulation by physicians (supported by professional
organizations, peer reviewers, and editors of professional journals of
endocrinology and sexuality), all of whom may have become the genial
puppets of Dr. New, and thus incompetent, professionally illiterate, and
criminally stupid.

CONCLUSION

Fully liberated from accepted standards of evidence-based and
argument-based reasoning, the LoC and Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann
expect their readers to embrace the trope of heartfelt, ideologically selfratifying “concern,” littered with groundless innuendos, as intellectually
and morally acceptable in bioethics.We cordially decline to do so, based
on the belief that, as a precedent, this would be catastrophic for the moral
and intellectual integrity of the field of bioethics. We are not at all
confident about whether subsequent events will affirm or undermine this
integrity. We renew our call for the LoC to be withdrawn and for
cosignatories to remove their names from it.3 The LoC, its signatories, and
its defenders in the commentaries damage the rights and interests of
persons with disorders of sexual development, which are best served by
evidence-based and argument-based bioethics guiding rigorous
scientific and clinical investigation.
1. Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann repeatedly commit the methodological
error of substituting rhetorical questions for evidencebased and argumentbased reasoning. Consider two examples. They ask, “Are they—New and
other clinicians—really thinking that it’s a good idea to use prenatal dex
because otherwise girls are more likely to end up tomboyish, aggressive,
and lesbian?” Philosophers will note in passing the loaded question fallacy
(“So, when did you stop beating your husband?”). This is not only a crude
reductio of a vast array of clinical and normative concerns; it also requires
that the signators of the LoC both affirm and deny that the use of fetal
dexamethasone is only for cosmetic purposes, yet another violation of the
principle of noncontradiction. They also ask, “McCullough and colleagues
reveal to us New’s apparent excuse for not having IRB approval: She
actually wrote only one script for prenatal dex. So why does theMaria New
Children’s Hormone Foundation boast to prospective patients that ‘She
has treated over 600 pregnant women at risk for the birth of a CAHaffected child’?” The context of the text on the foundation’s webpage is
plain: Treatment is offered under the protocol we described, under which
Dr. New does not prescribe dexamethasone to the patients of referring
physicians.
2. The phrases “transgressive bioethics” and “heteronormative eugenics”
were coined by Dr. Hippen and therefore would not appear in any
available literature search, as Kraft discovered concerning the former. The
phrase “the bioethics imaginary” originates with Dr. McCullough. We hope
these phrases, on balance, are more illustrative than obscurantist of the
rhetorical maneuvers used in the LoC and by Dreger, Feder, and
Lindemann and other commentators, but concede the risk of the reverse
with any neologism.

3. Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann (2010) come to the defense of the LoC.
Feder was the corresponding author (fetaldex.org 2010a). Lindemann
solicited co-signatories to the draft version of the LoC (mcw bioethics
listserv e-mail posted January 29, 2010, 11:48 a.m.), and Feder and Dreger
jointly sent letters that followed on the submission of the LoC to the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and three universities (fetaldex.org 2010b). Dreger,
Feder, and Lindemann therefore bear direct responsibility forwithdrawing
the LoC. As the person publicly taking responsibility for posting on
fetaldex.org, Dreger bears direct responsibility for posting on fetaldex.org
the announcements of the withdrawal of the LoC and of withdrawals
of co-signatories.
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